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Abstract. 
 This article explores the strategies carried out by the Spanish cotton industry, drawing the 
distinction between dynastic and non-dynastic companies, and the business strategies to preserve 
the family firm, to keep the control of management in the hands of the founder’s family, and to 
maintain long-term living standards. To achieve this, companies showed a remarkable capacity to 
adapt to the changing institutional, political and economic context in Spain during the second half 
of the twentieth century.  Finally, we measure the degree of success by looking at profits, 
profitability and ability of dynastic and non-dynastic companies to survive.    
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 I.  Introduction 
The family firm has a better reputation among historians today than a few years ago when 
the Chandlerian interpretation of it as being old fashioned, uncompetitive in world markets and 
lacking the necessary inversion in plant, marketing and organisation was common.2  The association 
of managerial hierarchies with successful modern economic growth, especially which found in the 
United States, contrasted with the British climacteric, and the survival of family businesses where 
the small scale of market structure acted as a supposed institutional barrier to growth.3  Neither has 
the neoclassical perspective provided a much more favourable vision of family firm. Here it was 
then considered frequently as being too small and inefficient because managers were selected from 
the owner’s family rather than on grounds of merit, and growth was achieved ‘organically’ using 
reinvested profits, with the use of capital markets limited to short-term finance. As a result, family 
firms suffered low profitability and had long-run survival problems, as even the most prosperous 
frequently end up having trouble with the descendants of the firm’s founder (Buddenbrook 
syndrome). To these neoclassical factors, Casson adds the following: i) the longevity of the firm; ii) 
the autocratic nature of management based on age and experience; iii) personal managing styles that 
reward loyalty rather than other attributes; iv) conservatism that reflects the traditional methods 
employed by the founder; v) the close relationship with the community, and the tendency to 
establish life-long commercial relations with other families.4 By contrast the New Institutional 
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approach to the nature of the firm allows us the possibility to consider not just its limits, but also the 
most appropriate managing system.  It also provides historians with the necessary tools to interpret 
better the performance of the family firm in its historical socio-economic environment.5   
In the literature, there is a wide debate on the definition of family firm and no one is broadly 
accepted.6 In addition, family business is subject to international variations and times evolution 
changes since family ownership form may display different capabilities in specific societies. Trying 
to synthesize a definition about family firm from management, some scholars have focused on the 
share of ownership and/or management by family members; others scholars have defined family 
business in terms of the degree of family involvement or potential for generational transfer; and 
finally, others have included the percentage of equity are under family control.7  
Astrachan and Shanker provide three rings of definitions from the very broad to more 
narrow; first, criteria of family’s retention of voting control over the strategic direction; second, the 
retention of the control by the family; and, third, the narrowest definition, the retention of voting 
control of the business and the involvement of multiple generations of family members in the day-
to-day operations of the firm.8  
The definition chosen will determine what is considered and what not a family business is.9 
Business History scholars normally choose definitions containing threes aspects: percentage of 
equity by family control, control of management by family and intergenerational transmission.10 
The definitions given in the literature have been exposed a growing complexity. Here, I define 
family firms as those whose control and ownership belongs to a single family. This control is held 
by an executive manager who is a member of the family, and two generations of the family 
participate in the company management. Ownership is defined here when at least 5 per cent of the 
shareholders voting rights belong to the family, or to an associated trust.11 Therefore, we exclude 
those firms belonging to single family, but which are managed by professional executives.12  
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 The dynastic element implies that the firm’s founder devises a strategy to preserve the firm 
so that it can be transmitted to the following generation, who in turn will be expected to safeguard 
it.13  Despite an implicit belief in the loyalty of the next generation, founders often exhibit a highly 
personal, autocratic style of leadership, which indicate a lack of trust in the future, despite the fact 
that their offspring, who have enjoyed extensive training, will inherit the company rather than 
outside professional managers. This fear concerning the reliability of the next generation frequently 
results in the founder retaining management control for longer than necessary, resulting in their 
successors assuming control only when they are well advanced in their professional life, and when 
they are thought to be able to manage the company according to the traditional values and working 
methods of the family.  The importance of the survival of the firm at any cost implies that 
successive generations are expected to continue even if it becomes loss making, with the firm’s 
closure only being considered when its financial reserves are exhausted, and perhaps even their own 
personal savings14. 
 Family firms can be divided into dynastic and non-dynastic. The former are owned by the 
family plus the principal places in the hierarchy are held by the same family, and considered to have 
a comparative advantage in the craft-based sector where scale economies are limited. By contrast 
non-dynastic family farms are considered to enjoy less control, and consequently family members 
are found in many fewer of the management posts. These firms are frequently to be found in the 
science-based sectors where scale economies are greater. Dynastic family firms suffer from a 
greater range of problems than ordinary family firms on account of the difficulties in finding 
enough suitable family members to fill all the managing posts. 
This article looks at the performance of companies within the Spanish cotton textile 
industry, using the distinction between dynastic and non-dynastic companies, and exploring the 
strategies employed by the former to fulfil their objectives in keeping the management of the 
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company within the family, and its long term survival. To achieve these goals, these companies 
showed a remarkable capacity in adapting to economic change during the second half of the 
twentieth century, and developing appropriate strategies to operate within Spain’s complicated 
institutional, political and economic framework. Finally, I estimate the degree of success of these 
strategies, using as indicators the level of profits, and the capacity to maintain the company active. 
The first section examines institutional and economic changes during the Franco regime, and its 
impact for business strategy.  Section 2 considers two hypotheses: whether the cotton textile firms 
followed conservative strategies, and whether the dynastic firms were more conservative than non-
dynastic ones. The strategies that are considered are a firm’s small size, its aversion to indebtedness, 
and a preference for organic growth.  These strategies in turn would help preserve the family’s 
control of the firm over several generations. Finally, I check the economic results of these strategies 
by comparing the profits obtained for both types of firms, and consider these within the general 
context of Spanish firms. 
II. Institutional framework of Spanish cotton industry. 
The economic policies followed by the Franco’s governments had a major impact on the 
environment in which the country’s business community had to operate within.15 Franco’s autarky 
policy was accompanied by an economic boycott and international isolation of the regime on 
account of its support for other fascist countries during World War II.16 Autarky also implied a high 
level of interventionism by the State, and its leading role in the industrialization of the country. 
Government intervention entailed an endless list of legal regulations that stilted the economy and 
made it very rigid. The State tightly regulated the distribution of raw materials, together with the 
permits required for the creation of new firms or for factory extensions, and foreign trade. In the 
particular case of cotton, the State regulated agricultural production, the first transformations 
(ginning and carding), the exploitation of sub-products (stripping, seeds and oil), and the trade of 
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the cotton fibres and their sub-products.17  The Ministry of Agriculture fixed the price of raw cotton 
and cotton fibre, and established the distribution of the fibre between the government’s 
representatives (Sindicatos Verticales), the cotton-ginners and the farmers.18 To encouraged the 
domestic production of raw cotton, the State also severely restricted the imports of cotton fibre 
between 1940 and 1962  
 Textile entrepreneurs therefore enjoyed protection not just from imports, but also from 
potential competitors in the domestic market, who faced considerable difficulties in establishing 
new factories. Therefore, instead of having to compete for market share, they dedicated their 
energies instead to obtaining raw materials and energy, distributed by the State by means of a quota 
system. This replacement of the market by the State distorted the allocation of resources and the 
structure of incentives, as not only was the distribution of raw material and energy inefficient and 
often arbitrary, but productivity declined as business found it difficult to modernise and replace 
machinery.  In this context, firms could be considered efficient if they were successful in obtaining 
a sufficient and regular supply of the indispensable inputs from the government, and thereby 
avoided having to pay the high prices for alternative supplies on the black market. This was 
difficult, however, as industrial demand for raw materials and energy was greater than what the 
government could supply. As a result, firms switched from a policy of maximising economic 
efficiency to one of rent seeking.19 Entrepreneurs dedicated significant resources to unproductive 
activities, such as speculating, influence peddling and corruption, in order to secure the necessary 
papers in Madrid to allow their business access to the necessary raw materials, energy and 
machinery.20 
Company expectations are an important indicator to understand the working of an economy 
or sector.21 In the autarchic years, the prospects for textile entrepreneurs were very uncertain. First, 
after the Second World War, the political future of Franco’s regime was uncertain, and there existed 
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the possibility that the democratic countries could try and overthrow the fascist regime. Second, the 
discretionary policies adopted by the State, such as the necessary permits for extensions or 
modifications of a plant, the acquisition of raw materials, the obstacles to importing modern 
machinery and, finally, there was an important fall in the consumption of cotton textiles.22 As a 
result, entrepreneurs minimized new investment and tried to keep their factories working, even 
though this involved declaring obsolete machinery as being operative, in order to increase their 
share of raw materials through the quota system. An adequate supply guaranteed either that the 
firm’s factory could be maintain fully active, or it would allow its owner to speculate on the black 
market. In either event, nationally production fell, and productivity declined.23 
 The political thaw started slowly in the early 1950s, involving various agreements with the 
USA, the return of foreign ambassadors to Madrid, and a concordat with the Vatican. This produced 
an increased supply of foreign currency thanks to American loans, and the permanency of the 
Franco regime was perceived as being more assured. These exogenous factors, together with he 
endogenous ones (maintenance of protectionism in the long term and control of salaries), led to 
greater optimism among entrepreneurs. The economic autarchy continued to isolate the Spanish 
textile industry from international competition, allowing the sector to survive in spite of 
productivity levels half those of the European average, a difference that the far lower salaries failed 
to compensate.24  In this context, in 1952-5 the cotton firms began to slowly increase investment, 
but the difficulties associated with obtaining raw cotton restricted investment to plant maintenance 
or the purchase of second hand machinery, rather than the latest technology.25  The effects of 
minimal investment over 20 years, 30 years if we include the period prior to the Civil War (early 
1930s), were obvious: old machinery, falling productivity and rising production costs making 
producers uncompetitive. These problems could only be overcome by protecting the home market, 
which explains why the Spanish cotton industry peaked in 1960 at the time that most other Western 
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Europe industries were in rapid decline in the face of traditional competitors such as Japan and 
India, or new ones such as Hong-Kong or Pakistan (Table 1).26    
In many European countries, including Spain, the cotton textile industry in the 1960s 
underwent major changes brought about by shifting comparative advantages to Less Developed 
Countries with their lower labour costs, and the maturing product cycles for cotton goods. Europe’s 
cotton textile industries failed to solve the inherited problems caused by the lack of sufficient 
investment for updating technology and improving productivity and growing competition implied 
that domestic industries progressively lost market share.27  For example, the reasons suggested to 
explain the English cotton industry’s failure include the absence of an adequate survival strategy to 
compete with the new technologies, such as the setting-up of factories in less developed economies, 
the search for new niche markets or products, product diversification, or restricting competition 
through collusion and pressuring the government for subsidies.28 In addition, business attitudes 
were pessimistic concerning the possibility of competing with cotton textile produced in countries 
with significantly lower labour costs once international markets were opened, especially as 
producers were losing markets to synthetic fibres. The persistence of the difficulties led the British 
cotton industry to carry out a process of rationalization and modernization. Large producers of 
synthetic fibres, Courtaulds and ICI, who integrated vertically their productions, directed the wave 
of business mergers and ended the myriad of small and medium-sized cotton-textile firms. A few, 
namely J. & P. Coats, Rossendale, David Whitehead and Sons, established themselves in countries 
with low labour costs, and Bleachers’ Association attempted to diversify their production to new 
niches in the markets. In spite of technological change and vertical integration, by the 1970s the 
new British textile industry had lost the battle. 
In Spain, the 1960s started with the progressive dismantling of the autarchic philosophy and, 
to a lesser extent, a decline in state intervention with the 1959-60 Stabilization Plan. The slow but 
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progressive opening of the economy allowed for accelerated growth, an increase in investment and, 
in the cotton industry, an increase in factory size and output until 1967. Further liberalization in 
1962 permitted any agent to establish a business at any point in the cotton commodity chain, 
whether as a farmer, industrialist, or a merchant. In addition, the industry’s supply problems were 
finally ended due to an increased flexibility in fibre imports.29 
On the other hand, the opening of the domestic market provoked, with a delay of a decade 
with respect to the rest of Europe, a reduction in profits caused by a lack of competitiveness in the 
face of growing foreign competition. This lack of competitiveness was caused by the widespread 
use of old machinery (average of 37.5 years), small scale businesses, and rapidly rising wages 
which were all contributing to deteriorated margins, at a time when the consumption of cotton 
fabrics was declining in the face of artificial fibres. These circumstances required a complete 
reappraisal of the sector. The restructuring plan, almost identical to the 1952 English plan, called for 
a modernization of the industry by means of new investment in machinery, the physical destruction 
of the old equipment (500,000 spindles and 20,000 looms), and the public assistance to finance their 
reconversion because the highly fragmented sector found it difficult to access formal capital 
markets. However, in reality the offer of special lines of credit for new machinery did not require 
that the old ones be scrapped, and these were sold to other businesses, with the consequent increase 
in the industry’s production capacity.30 One aspect of the plan, which was especially welcome by 
the larger companies, was the help to increase plant size through the absorption of smaller firms 
through mergers. Investment, which grew at an annual rate of 7.5 per cent in 1962-7 (but below the 
national average), increased to 10.8 per cent in 1967-73 (above the national average), helping 




III. The family business and strategy in the Spanish cotton textile industry. 
Although Spanish cotton firms were legally limited liability companies, ownership and 
management were in the hands of just one or two families, with none of the key management 
positions being in the hands of salaried executives. Differences were found, however, in that some 
firms, the “dynastic” firms, only employed family members in management hierarchy (Sedó SA., 
Manufacturas Valls, Manufacturas Viladomiu, Hilaturas Forcada, Colonia Guell). 32 By contrast, the 
“non-dynastic firms” hired both family members and salaried executives (Hytasa, La Espanya 
Industrial, Fabra y Coats) 33. Furthermore, we do not verify that any firm change from dynastic to 
non dynastic Business strategies were designed to achieve the firms main objectives, namely their 
longevity and the transfer of control to the next generation in the family. Profitability and growth 
were secondary objectives. I argue here that the strategy of these firms was conservative, and 
especially the dynastic firms which were reluctant to consider financing with outside funds. 34 
 In general, business strategies were determined by an “organic growth” based on self-
financing and a low level of indebtedness. The firm’s conservative nature did not impede, although 
it made it harder to adapt to the economic, political and institutional changes of the Franco regime. 
Not surprisingly, some firms adjusted with greater flexibility than others, a difference reflected in 
the dynastic and non-dynastic business structures. In the companies considered here, especially the 
dynastic ones, the firm’s business culture consisted of a set of values passed between generations, 
and internalised by the family owners, which made far reaching change difficult. Business culture 
was therefore less elastic than the wider changes taking place in society, and placed restrictions on 
the areas of potential activities which could be considered as solutions to the growing foreign 
competition.35 As a result dynastic firms followed more conservative strategies and had greater 
difficulties in adapting than the somewhat less conservative, and more flexible non-dynastic firms.36 
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Although fraud was widespread during this period of Spanish economic history, historians 
believe it was unlikely that limited liability companies falsified company balance-sheets and other 
information for their shareholders.37 A number of points need however to be taken into 
consideration when using them, especially given the particular characteristics of the period, and the 
nature of the companies being studied.38 In the first place, these firms had to survive a highly 
discretionary institutional framework which could have encouraged a masking of company accounts 
in order to facilitate their attempts at getting assistance or «favours» from the state.39 Likewise 80-
90 per cent of shareholding in the majority of these limited liability companies was controlled by 
one or two families, which made the falsification of the accounts easier. Fraud of this nature was 
further facilitated by the fact that the real financial situation of the company could be given to those 
present at the general shareholders meetings which, at times, involved fewer than ten people, of 
whom eight shared the same surname as the company’s founder, and discussion could take place 
which were not reflected in the minutes of the meeting. The financial aggregates included here have 
been standardised to be included in the balance-sheets for all the firms, including deprecation of 
fixed assets as negatives, and using simple addition, following the methodology of Catalán and 
Tafunell, due to the problems that arise through the use of weighted number indexes. The aggregate 
profits of the industry are based on the net earnings distributed after tax, as we do not have all the 
figures for depreciation, and to allow us to make a comparison of the economic cycles, and with the 
Tafunell series. Lastly, the possibility of using long run series is limited by the lack of sources from 
the late 1960s (Fabra and Coats -1939 to 1970-, Colonia Guell -1939 to 1969-, La Espanya 
Industrial -1939 to 1961-, Manufacturas Valls -1939 to 1967- ,Manufacturas Sedó -1939 to 1956, 
Hytasa -1941 to 1980-, Manufacturas Viladomiu -1939 to 1974-, Hilaturas Forcada -1939 to 1981-), 
making it impossible to comment on the neoclassical hypothesis that, during times of crisis and in 
competitive markets, family businesses find it difficult to survive. 
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Figure 1. Financial Equilibrium of the cotton companies, 1939-1971. 
 
Source: Company balance-sheets. Own elaboration 
 
The conservative nature of the business strategies is tested in the balance sheets (Figure 1) 
and in the analysis of liabilities (Figure 2). The balance sheets were positive, especially in the 
1940s, with respect to the question of whether the company had a positive net worth. Over the thirty 
years the classic situation of financial balance was maintained, that is to say, the value of assets 
were superior to liabilities and, in addition, the value of circulating assets was higher than the 
circulating liabilities, guaranteeing business solvency for payments in both the short and long run.  
The only years unbalanced appear after 1962, and only in the short term, due to a lack of 
liquidity produced by an equalization of circulating liabilities with circulating assets although, at all 
times, solvency was safeguarded by counting on a positive net worth. The structure of liabilities 
reinforces the conservative vision of business strategy, given the preponderance of the use of own 
capital until 1959-1961. In particular, between 1939 and 1949, firms followed the policy of 
maximising financial stability, shielding themselves from any adverse circumstance that could arise, 
by holding liabilities which were dominated by commons stock—around 50 per cent-- and equity 
(commons stock plus reserves) approaching 75 per cent. Therefore, only 25 per cent of the 
liabilities were borrowed commons stock, largely short-term, which partly financed working capital, 
with the result that reinvested profits were used both for fixed investment as well as a high share of 
working capital. Only with the government encouraged for restructuring the sector in the 1960s was 
outside capital used for fixed investment in the modernization and expansion of plant.  
I also anticipated the more conservative behaviour of dynastic firms respect to non-dynastic 
ones. The structure of the liabilities (Figure 2) reveal the level of preference for self finance rather 
than outside capital, and the predilection for raising capital levels to increase the firm’s resources, 
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so long as control stayed within the family. Dynastic firms accumulated around 80 per cent of 
liabilities in equity, of which capital accounted for between 60 and 80 per cent in the period 1939-
1948, with little use of reserves. The level of self-finance was lower in non-dynastic firms, which 
maintained share capital at around 60-50 per cent of liabilities. During the 1950s, with certain minor 
differences, the firms developed a similar response to deal with the gradual reduction in self-finance 
and the parallel increase in the use of outside capital. Dynastic firms maintained a greater use of 
share capital in contrast to a preference for balancing capital and reserves in the non-dynastic firms. 
The firms became financially less conservative after the Stabilization of 1959. Financial 
modernization led to a decline in self financing and a move towards borrowed capital, in the long 
and short term, with the consequent risk of becoming insolvent and having to suspend payments in 
the event of economic difficulties. During the economic crisis of the 1970s, the firms were forced to 
turn to their own reserves to absorb losses, whether on account of their diminished earnings or to 
repay amortization (Figure 2). On this occasion the conservative policies of dynastic firms was 
more effective in containing the first blow, thanks to their accumulated reserves, while the reserves 
of the non-dynastic firms practically disappeared because of the crisis. The assertion that dynastic 
firms adopted more conservative strategies than non-dynastic ones is supported by the ratios of 
debt-equity (Figure 3) and the acid test (Figure 4)40. In all cases the dynastic firms aimed for a 
lower level of indebtedness and the use of their own capital, in contrast to the non-dynastic firms 
which were somewhat more inclined to outside financing.  
 
Figure 2. Nature of dynastic and non-dynastic cotton textile firms’ liabilities 
Source: Company balance-sheets. Own elaboration. 
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In addition, dynastic firms to a greater extent than the non-dynastic ones, made other 
decisions of a particularly prudent nature that can be interpreted as an incorrect use of resources, 
keeping capital as cash or in deposit accounts, rather than investing it in the business, or in a 
portfolio of remunerative value. The increase in firms’ liquidity coincided with those moments of 
greatest tension, such as at the end of the Second World War when many feared an invasion, or the 
economic uncertainty following the opening up of the regime at the beginning of the 1950s, or the 
Stabilization Plan. The uncertainties at each moment are reflected in the disappearance of long-term 
investment strategies and an overall mistrust of about the future. The businessmen preferred cash 
payments and avoid advancing credit, which was almost totally absent in the balance-sheets of the 
1940s, because of the inevitable difficulties that many clients had in paying off their debts. In this 
decade firms insisted on having instant liquidity at their disposal (close to 10 per cent of liabilities), 
whether as cash or in their current accounts. An extreme case was that of Sedó S.A., whose 
principal current account was in the Banco de España, the safest possible solution. 
Labelling as conservative Spanish cotton firms’ strategies must be clarified, since these were 
gradually modified to adapt to the changes that took place in the economic and industrial 
framework of the Franco regime. The capacity of the firms to adapt can be verified in the switch 
from their conservative approach in the 1940s, displayed by their aversion to risk and shown by the 
increase in their capital reserves, to the somewhat more ambitious policies beginning in 1952, when 
firms increased investment and commercial activities, in a protected environment and assisted by 
American loans. However it is necessary to wait until the years after the Stabilization Plan for the 
business strategies of the firms to take a definitive change, when they became willing to assume 
higher levels of commercial and financial risk, to introduce more professional management, and 
modernised their industrial plant with the investment coming as much from long-term borrowed 
capital, as being self-financed.  
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 The approach is endorsed by the main ratios measuring business solvency, which show a 
financial situation of maximum solvency until 1952, with dynastic firms even self-financing a 
relatively high share of their working capital. The 1952 change allowed non-dynastic firms to adapt 
and show a greater predisposition to using borrowed capital, which enabled them to take advantage 
of a favourable moment for growth, while the dynastic firms preferred to maintain a more ultra-
conservative performance. Therefore, while dynastic firms persevered at a low level of indebtedness 
and high levels of cash reserves in spite of an increase in economic activity, the non-dynastic firms 
preferred to turn to a greater extent to outside finance, especially in the short term, to support the 
increase in business activity. As a result it is during the 1950s that a greater divergence between the 
two types of firms that become apparent. 
 
Figure 3. Debt-equity ratio in dynastic and non-dynastic cotton firms 
Source: Company balance-sheets. Own elaboration. 
 
 It would only be after 1959-1960 when the firms, pushed by the economic boom and the 
growth in consumption, joined the sector’s restructuring plan launched by the government in 1962, 
which encouraged them to use borrowed capital in invest in new technology, buildings and 
manufacturing organization. In this respect, Spanish business strategy of the 1970s was somewhat 
similar to that implemented in the United Kingdom in the 1960s, with the idea that larger firms 
would produce economies of scale, and permit the industry to compete with foreign competitors. 
The difference resided in that Spanish businesses invested their capital to achieve organic growth in 
a growing market, while in the United Kingdom investment was directed to the merging of different 
firms. In Spain, the firms put into effect new strategies to modernize their factories, making a 
process of long-term investment essential that required in turn the use of more modern financing 
 16
methods, such as the use of short-term commercial bank loans to provide working capital and long-
term debts to complement the self-financing of fixed capital assets.  The result was the evolution of 
financial ratios towards levels which are considered more normal in financial accounting theory. To 
a lesser extent, non-dynastic firms relied less on the reinvestment of earnings, endogenous growth, 
and chose a path of greater indebtedness. For their part, and even with the new opportunities, 
dynastic firms maintained the old business culture of growth using their own capital and in the 
reinvestment of earnings, remaining reluctant to turn to outside financing as their long-term 
longevity remained a major management goal. 
 
Figure 4. Acid test of dynastic and non-dynastic cotton firms 
Source: Company balance-sheets. Own elaboration. 
 
 The goals of longevity and family inheritance were comfortably achieved between 1939 and 
1970 (Table 2).41 A review of the history of the different firms demonstrates the longevity and 
transfer of internal power over three and four generations starting from the mid nineteenth century 
when the majority were founded, until the last third of the twentieth century.42 This was achieved by  
autocratic management maintained until death of the manager. Family control allowed the survival 
of the founder’s surname, independent of the legal organisation of the company at any particular 
moment.43 The construction of a network of connections of the “extended family” type, as advanced 
in the Casson model, can be seen in the overlapping interests of cotton families and other industrial 
and financial families.44 The Bertrand Serra business group had ties with the Sedó business group 
and both had advisors at the Garriga Nogués, Mas Sardá and Hispanoamericano banks. The vice-
president of the Garriga Nogués bank was also advisor for Hilaturas Fabra i Coats. A branch of the 
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Valls family was on the board of administration for the banks Español de Crédito and Exterior de 
España, and the Valls Taberner family for the Banco Popular.45 
 
IV. Economic results of business strategies: profits and profitability. 
 In the section I measure the outcomes of the business strategies by their profits to discover 
different behaviour for dynastic and non-dynastic firms. If the main goal was survival, the second 
most important was profitability, being itself a guarantee for longevity and maintenance of the 
family’s living standards. The earnings of the cotton firms compared with the average earnings for 
the whole economy, shows a sector that achieved better than average results during the first five 
years of the 1940s, resulting from the delayed consumption caused by the Civil War, followed by 
five years of stagnancy, and then another of recession (Figure 5). From then the positive evolution 
of cotton firm earnings remained below the national average, and clearly declined from the end of 
the 1960s.  
 
Figure 5. Level of profits in the Spanish economy and cotton textile industry (current pesetas, 1940 
=100)  
Source: Tafunell (1996, 1998) and own elaboration. 
 
 Even more interesting is the evolution of financial profitability that shows a different 
behaviour between dynastic and non-dynastic firms (Figure 6). In all, financial profitability reached 
significant levels until 1967, with results of over 10 per cent and never falling to less than 5 per cent 
until the opening of the domestic market allowed for competition and the beginnings of difficulties, 
anticipating the shock of the 1970s. The supposed cotton industry crisis of the 1940s, as suggested 
in the literature, needs therefore to be reconsidered with these figures for profitability.46 Generally, 
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this period is presented as difficult years on account of the lack of raw materials, intermediate input 
energy, etc. This vision was contested by the data by Morellá that stressed the cotton sector’s 
recovery between 1940 and 1945), these years coincided with our figures which show an average 
profitability of around 20 per cent for dynastic firms and over 15 per cent for non-dynastic firms.47 
During the second quinquennial of the 1940s,  the general decline in consumer consumption, 
contributed to a fall in profits, but these still maintained an average of more than 10 per cent. A 
sector with such a level profitability is not a sector that can be described as in crisis, although it is 
true that this information corresponds to the larger firms, and it is possible that small ones had 
greater difficulties, especially if they lacked the political contacts in Madrid for the necessary papas 
for raw materials and spares. 
 
Figure 6. Financial profitability of cotton firms, 1939-1971. 
Source: Company balance-sheets. Own elaboration. 
 
 The differences in the trends in profitability in dynastic and non-dynastic firms are of special 
interest. In the first quinquennial of the 1940s the more traditional and conservative managed 
dynastic firms produced better results than the more risky management of non-dynastic firms. 
However, from the end of the 1940s, behaviour and results changed fairly significantly. The profits 
of dynastic firms declined from 20 per cent in 1945 to less than 5 per cent in 1962, without any 
tendency of a reversal. By contrast non-dynastic firms were more successful and, after suffering a 
setback in the late 1940s, they recovered in the 1950s and maintained acceptable levels of profits 
until the end of the 1970s, when the opening of the Spanish economy led to foreign competition, 




 The history of the Spanish cotton-textile industry did not differ significantly from that of 
other European textile industries, but rather experienced a delay of approximately ten years in the 
appearance of major problems caused by foreign competition. The solutions proposed to reorganise 
the sector were almost identical to the earlier attempts in Britain. 
 This article has outlined the evolution of strategies of Spanish cotton firms during the 
Franco period. It has shown how strategies of extreme caution were implemented to achieve the 
longevity of the company, to maintain the family control, and these were reinforced by profitability 
and organic growth.  I argue that policies changed over the thirty years, as firms tried to adapt to 
changes in the institutional and economic framework of the dictatorship. Neither were firms 
homogeneous, but rather the dynastic family firms were more conservative than the non-dynastic 
ones. 
 The economic autarchy of the early Franco period reserved the domestic market exclusively 
for Spanish firms, but at the considerable cost of restricting supplies of sufficient raw materials and 
spare parts, and the substitution of the market by the bureaucracy of the State. Government 
economic politics and the uncertain future caused by a hostile international environment caused 
cotton firms to be especially prudent. During the 1940s, firms failed to implement growth strategies 
or pursue plant modernization despite good economic results, especially by the dynastic firms. The 
slow improvement in international relations in the early 1950s, combined with consolidation of the 
regime, provided a more attractive climate for business, leading to limited investment and a strategy 
of organic growth and low ratios of indebtedness. The 1960s inaugurated a decade of rapid 
economic development, even faster than the European average. With the Stabilization Plan, the 
growth restriction of previous years disappeared and business expectations in the sector were 
especially optimistic until the end of the 1960s, as domestic markets continued to be protected. 
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Non-dynastic firms undertook ambitious investment plans, seeking to increase size and capture 
economies of scale, assume a more modern strategy of indebtedness, and reduce the relative 
importance of their own capital. Dynastic firms, by contrast, failed to change their growth model or 
strategies. Therefore, while the dynastic firms, following traditional policies, saw their earnings and 
profitability steadily diminished from the mid 1940s, non-dynastic firms enjoyed a golden decade of 
high profitability between 1952 and 1967. The crisis of 1967 crisis, with its steep fall in the leading 
financial indicators, was a foretaste of the major difficulties that the entire sector would face from 
the early 1970s. 
 The liabilities structure and the evolution of the most significant financial ratios show 
conclusively that the dynastic cotton-textile firms were excessively financed with their own capital, 
and significant amounts of assets were kept as cash or left in deposit accounts, rather than invested 
in the firm or in other, higher yielding portfolios. I have shown the especially conservative strategy 
adopted by dynastic firms, decisions linked to the “culture” of each one of them and related to the 
characteristics of a family business.48 Dynastic firms continued behaving as they had since their 
founding and, because this had provided good financial results, they were unwilling to change 
management structures, even though these were probably more suited to the nineteenth century than 
the second half of the twentieth century. The financial results could not have been more disastrous, 
and cannot be attributed to the lack of alternatives or to especially difficult trading conditions, as in 
the 60s the non-dynastic firms enjoyed profits of closer to 15 per cent than to 10 per cent. 
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Table 1. Cotton spindles installed in countries of Western Europe (thousands) 
 Belgium France Germany Italy Portugal Spain UK 
1930 2.172 10.250 11.070 5.342 503 1.875 55.207 
1935 2.091 10.157   5.477 452 2.070 43.756 
1939 1.984 9.794 12.225 5.324 444 2.000 36.322 
1950 1.802 8.148 5.785 5.566 536 2.210 29.580 
1955 1.752 7.618 6.005 5.698 896 2.335 25.183 
1960 1.493 5.802 5.909 4.611 1.101 2.589 9.710 
1965 1.337 4.299 5.091 4.424 1.198 2.580 5.345 
1970 985 3.588 4.262 4.121 1.357 2.210 3.486 
Source: B.R. Mitchell International historical statistics: Europe 1750-1988, New York (1992). 
 26 
 








Founder Second generation Third generation Fourth generation 
Colonia Güell(a) 1845 1920 1973 Joan Güell Ferrer (1845-
1872) 
Eusebi Güell I Bacigalupi 
(1872-1918) 
Eusebi Güell (1918-1943) Familia Bertrand Serra 
(1943-1973) 
Hytasa 1937 1937 1980 Prudencio Pumar Cuartero 
(1937-)(j) 
   
Compañía Anónima 
de Hilaturas de 
Fabra y Coats 
1903 
© 
1903  Ferran(1903-1944) y 
Romá Frabra (1903-1948) 





1847 1847 1981 Isidre y J. Antoni Muntadas i 
Campeny (1847-1880) 
Macia Muntadas i Rovira 
(1881-1927) 
Josep. M D’Albert i de 
Despujol (1927-1952)(b) 






1991 Esteve Valls i Pascual 
(1862-) 
Isidro Valls I Pallerola (¿1900-
1933) 











1850 1934 1982 Tomás Viladomiu i Bertrán 
(1850-1866) 
(1869-1887) 
Josep Vialdomiu y Montañá 
(1887-1906)(f) 










1940 1992 Esteve Burés (1875-1893) Francesc Burés y Borras (1893-
1907) 
Francesc 
Burés i Regodorsa (1907-
1952) 
Josep M. Juncadella Burés 
(1952-) (i) 
 Date of death. The first date is when the individual joined the management of the firm. 
(a) Previously Vapor Vell 
(b) He had been married to Carme Muntadas i Estruch, daughter of Macia Muntadas i Rovira 
(c) The result of the merger started by Puig and Fabra in 1838 with Ferran Puig, Portabella y Compañía-, with Camil Fabra i Compañía Successors de Ferran Puig, -which dates from 
1860 with Camil  Fabra i Compañía-. In 1903 merged with J.P. Coats. 
(d). Previously Puig y Compañía, founded in 1841. 
(e) Management shared with his brothers Martí (1936) and Luis (1952) 
(f) Management shared with his with brothers Marc (1890) and Jacint, who leaves in 1890. 
(g) Previously Manufacturers of Ter and Lobregat S.A. which had been seized, and in 1939 had capital of 4,000,000 pesetas. Possible merger with the business of Francisco Burés 
Regodorsa ,whose last balance sheet of 1940 had a capital of about 6,895,000 pesetas. 
(h) Born as Burés Germans 
(i) Son of Angels Burés i Regodorsa 
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